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THE PARAMOUNT POWER OF THE PACIFIC.

BY JOHN BARRETT, FORMERLY UNITED STATES
MINISTER TO SIAM.

THE most remarkable result of the late war with Spain is one we never anticipated: it has made the United States the paramount power of the Pacific. We unexpectedly assumed this responsibility on the first of May, 1898. When Admiral Dewey destroyed the fleet and sovereignty of Spain, he built up in one brief day the influence and prestige of the United States throughout all the Pacific Seas. He accomplished in a few hours what otherwise might not have been realized in a half century—or possibly never. To use a homely but expressive figure, he picked up American influence as if it were a peg stuck in a hole, and put it down tight in the first or leading position.

If I use earnest terms in this discussion of America's interests in the Far East—which I have written at the special request of the Editor of the *NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*—I would ask my critics and those who oppose our policy in the Pacific, to remember that we who labored faithfully and patiently during the long years preceding the late war to protect and advance America's material and political interests in Oriental nations, have possibly a keener appreciation of the mighty change wrought than they who viewed the situation from afar, and often with the large end of the glass nearest the eye. It is one thing to sit in an American sanctum, library, club, or Congressional committee room, and outline how American interests should be guarded and strengthened in Asiatic realms; and quite another, after setting out for these same countries, 7,000 to 10,000 miles away from Washington, and hastening to our posts with commissions in hand, not only to realize with profound chagrin that American influence decreased in direct proportion as the distance increased, but to be received

on our arrival at these Eastern courts as the representatives of a nation holding an indefinite position somewhere down the line after Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and even little Holland and Belgium—and not as the Ministers and Envoys of a first class world power!

But the effect of war was magical. Only those residing in the Orient could appreciate it. The first signs of this renaissance of American influence were seen when Dewey made Hong Kong the rendezvous of his squadron in March, 1898. Then the battle was fought. It was followed by a rising wave of American prestige that swept up and down the Coast like the rush of a tidal current, gradually returning to its natural strength, but leaving everywhere its distinct impression. After Manila fell, and the long, sad period of inactivity followed, there was a reaction. Doubt existed as to whether America would realize her splendid opportunity, not only in the Philippines but throughout the entire East. Then finally came the unfortunate delay in treaty confirmation—responsible in a degree for the present conflict and bloodshed. But when ratification triumphed, diplomats and business men immediately began to reconsider their policies and lines of action, on the basis of America's becoming the paramount power of the Pacific.

When I contrasted the attention given to American interests, political and commercial, moral and social, in all the leading capitals of the Far East, from Java to Japan, during my last trip north, with what my colleagues and myself had repeatedly seen and experienced in former years, it made my heart glad, and I felt that such a result in a measure offset the difficulties involved in the occupation of the Philippines. But there is not only the sentimental side to this American movement; every branch of trade is feeling it; and American connections are being sought by merchants of all nationalities. And yet this is only the beginning.

PERSONAL STUDY OF SUBJECT.

Possibly I may be pardoned for making some reference to my personal study of the subject, in order that my humble observations may have more weight. Ever since I first went to the Far East, inspired with the belief that the western coast States of America must look to the Pacific for the development of permanent conditions of prosperity, I have been a devoted advocate of

the American opportunity in the Pacific. For five years I have hammered away in reports to the Government, letters to Chambers of Commerce, and contributions to newspapers, magazines, and reviews, including particularly the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, with the hope of thus awakening our Government, as well as our manufacturers and exporters, to an appreciation of the splendid field awaiting their best efforts. After long continued discussion, much of it in vain, it is most gratifying to see some reciprocal interest manifested and my unpretentious prophecies coming true. But the pleasure and satisfaction are alloyed with the fear that, just as we are on the threshold of our greatest possibilities, the door of trade may be closed in our faces. Then we shall be helpless.

It has been my privilege to visit during my leaves of absence not only the interior of Siam, but to travel in Japan, Siberia, Korea, Manchuria, China, Formosa, Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Java, and the Philippines—all with the sole purpose of familiarizing myself with the commercial and political situation. My first journey was made in 1894, my last in 1899; so I trust that I am in comparative touch with the conditions described and discussed.

THE MORAL ISSUES INVOLVED.

There is not time or space in this paper to discuss the moral side of our position and policy in the Philippines or in China, but I would not underrate this phase of the question. Every man has his own opinion and system of reasoning in regard to America's responsibilities and rights of action. Possibly one man's views are as good as another's. In discussing, on the other hand, the material or commercial aspect of the situation, positive *data* and actual survey and study of the field are necessary to approach the truth. In leaving the moral issues to general consideration, I would submit only one specific statement of my doctrine. The United States have assumed a mighty and unavoidable responsibility, not only to themselves and the natives, but to the world, in occupying the Philippine Islands. They could not return them to their former sovereignty, sell them to another power, or yield them to absolute native rule, without shirking that responsibility, and taking a backward step from which the nation would never recover. In their attitude toward China, they should be charitable to that government's faults, lend a

strong hand when possible, and avoid under all circumstances bulldozing and robbing tactics in efforts to obtain by force territory or ports which should only be occupied by legitimate agreement.

PHILIPPINE INTERESTS OVERSHADOW PERIL IN CHINA.

There is imminent danger that, in the attention we are giving the Philippine question, we will forget our growing interests in China. The latter are too important, in comparison with the former, to be overlooked. It can be logically argued that our commercial opportunities in China are far greater than they ever will be in the Philippines, under the most favorable conditions. Therefore, while we are setting matters right in our new possessions, we must not allow them to go wrong in China, where our old established treaties are being stretched—not by China herself, but by her neighbors. As we clean up a new room, we must not let strangers enter by the back way and raid the store-room. What will it profit us if we open the door of the Philippines, only to see that of China closed against us?

And yet I indulge in no exaggeration when I say there is a grave peril confronting our interests in the Middle Kingdom. I speak from long observation, supported by the private conclusions—if they could make them public—of our present Ministers and Consuls. I was compelled to keep silent myself until relieved of the responsibilities of my former position. What I now declare, however, is no indiscretion, because it is a simple statement of truth which does not in any way disclose the relations of the United States with other nations. It is most difficult, I admit, to name a specific act that is contrary to the treaties in their diplomatic interpretation, but those of us who have travelled through Manchuria and Shantung on the north, and Kwangsi and Yunnan on the south, have seen conditions and influences that are having the same moral effect as actual closure.

“OPEN DOOR” AND “SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.”

There are certain terms employed in reference to China which are of sufficient importance to warrant brief special mention in consideration of the main subject. The “open door,” as the phrase is commonly used, means nothing more than the maintenance without limitations of the treaty rights of trade throughout the empire, with all nations on an equal footing. It does not imply that there is no duty or tariff, but simply that all lands must pay

the same duty or tariff as agreed upon in the original Tientsin treaties. "Spheres of influence," in their technical sense, mean sections of country where the nation exercising the influence contends that no other nation shall ever acquire sovereignty or secure privileged concessions; but, as far as China is concerned, it is a sugar-coated diplomatic phrase which is practically equal to "areas of absolute sovereignty," and that is the condition into which they will inevitably evolve unless some great change should be wrought in China's government in the very near future.

It is possible to have the "open door" and "spheres of influence" at one and the same time, and that is the policy which the United States must insist upon if the integrity of the empire is not preserved; otherwise, our great and growing markets will be entirely lost to us. While we should do everything in our power to prevent the disintegration of China, at the same time, in realization of the fact that we cannot go to war in support of such a policy, if we see that the break-up is inevitable, we must leave no stone unturned to preserve our old treaty rights in a new form with the powers in control. If this is accomplished, it may come to pass that our trade and commerce in the country that was once China will be greater than ever otherwise possible. I doubt, however, as do most authorities on China, if such a fortunate result would ever attend our efforts, but we must take every eventuality into consideration and be prepared for any turn whatsoever in the tide.

ALL SECTIONS INTERESTED.

The Far East, particularly China, affords markets which should arouse the interest of all sections of the United States, and make the country stand unanimously for a firm policy. The West and East and the North and South are equally concerned in maintaining the freedom of trade and preserving our treaty rights throughout China. Were it merely a sectional issue, there might be a grave question as to the advisability of taking a strong position as to the future of the empire. China and other Asiatic countries want all the flour and timber, and a goodly portion of other kinds of food and raw products, which California, Oregon, Washington and neighboring Western States can supply; they want the manufactured cotton and raw cotton of the South in increasing quantities, and the time may come when this Pacific-Asiatic demand will take up the surplus supply of the South's

great staple; they want the manufactured cotton, iron, steel, and miscellaneous products of the North and East, together with unlimited quantities of petroleum; they want corresponding manufactured products of the central West, and there is no reason why there should not be developed among the Asiatic millions a demand for the central West's great staple, maize (or Indian meal), such as there has been created for flour. I draw no fancy picture, but simply express my honest opinion after five years' careful study of the field which I am discussing.

The question of protecting such markets appeals to capitalist and laboring man alike. It offers the former an opportunity for the investment of his capital, and it increases the employment and wages of the latter by providing a greater demand. The masses of our people, especially the laboring classes, are inclined to think that the Chinese question is one which should not concern them, and in the haziness of their views they may think that it has to do with Chinese labor, which, of course, looms up to them as a mighty danger, while in fact they are as much concerned as the manufacturer and exporter, and are to-day in many sections of the country and in numerous establishments absolutely dependent upon the Chinese market for their employment. The farmers of the West and South can unite with the laboring men of the North and East in supporting the shippers, manufacturers and exporters in developing a strong Asiatic policy. Were the door of China closed against us to-morrow, it would mean that labor and capital alike would suffer immeasurable harm. They should, therefore, see that it is never closed.

If I were asked to make my argument complete by showing what will be the principal specific demands of the Far East for American products, I should say that they would include flour and breadstuffs, cotton goods and raw cotton, kerosene oil, timber, manufactured iron and steel products, machinery and hardware, locomotives, cars, rails, sewing machines, clocks and watches, telephone and telegraph apparatus, electric railways, electric lights, electric supplies, canned goods, wines, spirits and liquors, chemicals and medicines, tobacco, leather and paper, with an endless variety of manufactured articles commonly known as "muck and truck."

LAND OF GREAT POTENTIALITIES.

China is a nation of incalculable possibilities. The more one

studies her, travels in the interior, or investigates her resources, the more one is convinced that she has only begun her material advancement. Whenever I have been up the Yangtse river, travelled overland, or visited the coast ports or interior towns, I have been impressed more and more with the future before her, if she shall ever be well governed and not divided up among foreign nations.

If I seem to employ strong terms in describing the opportunities in China and the Far East, I beg to remind my readers that the leading American, British and German engineers and explorers who have travelled thoroughly over these countries support my contentions. China possesses unlimited quantities of coal and iron, which are already located; and there are numerous indications of gold and silver and other precious metals. There is no valid reason why China should not be covered with a network of railways. She has the population and the products to support them. It is often contended that China can never be such a great commercial nation as has been predicted by many authorities, because she has not the buying capacity. There is no better way to develop such capacity than by opening up the interior. Money will then flow in from the outside to purchase raw supplies, and will provide the people with means to buy the manufactured products of other nations.

Manchuria affords one of the best object lessons of American opportunity. The growth of the demand there for certain classes of American cotton goods has been phenomenal. It was not many years ago that the market was very limited. There are even on record reports of consuls and of special agents of cotton firms, which said that there was no field for the expansion of American trade. To-day the marvel of business interests in northern China is the development of the market for American cotton goods in Manchuria. When I first visited New-Chwang, the gateway to Manchuria, American imports were not over 15 per cent. of the total; on my last visit they were more than 50 per cent., with the proportion increasing every day! Notwithstanding this marked growth, only a small proportion of Manchuria's millions has been reached. If the great northern provinces of China now require \$7,000,000 worth of our cottons, there is no valid reason why they should not in ten years from now consume \$20,000,000 worth. A few years ago, \$3,000,000 represented the value of the trade. When we consider that the cotton mills of New England and the

South are supplying this demand in Manchuria, and that they have even been kept running when other mills have been closed, there is every reason why those two sections should join together in insisting that the open door shall always apply to Manchuria.

American exports to the Far East to-day approximate \$40,000,000, if the actual value of everything which leaves our shores is counted; but, basing our estimates on reasonable grounds, there is no reason why they should not expand in the near future to \$150,000,000, and our total exchange reach \$300,000,000. Few people appreciate the enormous business that is now done up and down the Pacific Asiatic coast. It amounts to \$1,000,000,000, gold, *per annum*, and represents 500,000,000 people. Of this, the imports are over half. Certainly it is logical to hold that the United States should be able to supply at least a third of the products now imported from foreign lands. China's trade amounts to \$250,000,000 with a population of 350,000,000 people. If her wants ever expand in any such degree as those of Japan and other countries which have awakened from their Asiatic lethargy, her foreign trade should reach, on a conservative estimate, \$500,000,000. Were the same ratio of population to trade, or one to two, which exists in all other countries of Asia, progressive and retrogressive, applied to China, her future foreign exchange could be estimated at \$700,000,000. I do not mean that it can or will attain these figures within this generation, but it is a logical possibility, provided always that the government is reformed and the door of trade is not closed.

As a marked illustration of the difficulty of forecasting the limit of American exports to China, I would call special attention to the flour trade. Some of our consuls and trade experts declared, but a few years ago, that wheat flour would never be accepted in large quantities by the Chinese. It was contended that they did not want it, did not need it, and could not be induced to take it. The exporters of California and Oregon were even advised to spend no more money in an effort to build up a market. And yet the development of the flour trade is even more marvellous than that of cotton. The shipments, for instance, from Portland, Oregon, to Hong Kong have increased 1,600 per cent. in the last ten years, and, taken with those of San Francisco and the Puget Sound ports, aggregate many millions of dollars *per annum*! Considering what a small portion of China's millions has commenced

to use flour, it is difficult to place any reasonable limit on the future demand.

PHILIPPINE RESOURCES AND CLIMATE.

In this article I am giving little or no attention to the vital interest which we have in the Philippines, because that is worthy of a separate discussion, and has already been exhaustively treated by others. I wish, however, to go on record as saying that, from extended travels through the Islands before the war, and from visits to them later in time of war and American control, I am convinced that they hold out not only great opportunities for commerce and trade, but for legitimate investment and exploitation. It is my opinion, supported not only by Americans but by Britons who have travelled through the interior, that there is no richer undeveloped portion of Asia than the Philippine group. The foreign commerce of the Islands, which now amounts to over \$30,000,000, should be trebled within the next decade, and there is room for railway construction alone that would involve the expenditure of \$150,000,000, in portions of the Islands having a large population and extensive products. Comparing Luzon with Nippon, the principal island of Japan, the interiors of both of which I have visited, I would say that, aside from area and population, the comparison is altogether in favor of Luzon.

As for the climate, the Philippines are no worse than other tropical lands, and Manila can compare favorably with Hong Kong, Bangkok, Singapore and Batavia, where European officials and business men, with their families and employees, live in fair health, comfort and happiness. I personally suffered more during the recent hot wave in New York and Chicago than I ever did from heat of the tropics in four years' stay in Bangkok. More people die of *grippe* in New York in one year than of fever, cholera and plague in Manila in ten years.

Our problems of government and establishment of law and order we will successfully solve if our people will be patient and with confidence await the issue. The end of the next dry season should see the end of the present insurrection.

JAPAN'S NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

Another important consideration which directly affects America's interests in the Far East is also being hidden by the general discussion of the Philippine situation. On July 16th, Americans and American interests in Japan passed out from under the juris-

dition of our consuls and went under that of Japan. In other words, the old treaties which have been in force ever since the time of Commodore Perry, who, like Admiral Dewey, brought us new prominence and influence in the Orient, became null and void on that day, and the new ones, which give Japan the rights of all other powers over foreigners residing or visiting within their limits, came into force. This is a grave experiment, and all foreigners in Japan are greatly concerned as to the effect upon their interests of such a radical change. When I visited Japan recently, I found the question of the application of the new treaties the all absorbing topic of discussion and argument. While there is great difference of opinion as to that country's ability to successfully administer jurisdiction over the subjects of other nations, the leading Japanese statesmen, such as Count Ito, Count Okuma, **Marshal Yamagata** and Viscount Aoki, hold that Japan will faithfully meet her new responsibilities, and prove to the world her ability to rank with other nations as a first-class power in every respect.

The United States, in watching the situation and seeing that our interests do not suffer under the new system, can at the same time show such consideration and co-operation as to win Japan's gratitude and merit her support in the policies which together they may see fit to promote in the Pacific and Far East. We cannot afford to overlook serious defects in Japanese jurisdiction, but we can be reasonably charitable during the first year of its application. It should be given at least a fair test. If it fails, the treaty provides for a remedy. Our material interests in Japan are great, and they are growing. We have no reason yet to believe they will suffer under the new jurisdiction.

OTHER UNDEVELOPED FIELDS.

The resources, possibilities, and opportunities of Indo-China, the Straits Settlements, Java, and Borneo, on the south, of Formosa in the central section, and of Korea and Siberia on the north, aside from Japan, Siam and the Philippines, elsewhere briefly discussed, are sufficient each in itself to be the subject of an article, and therefore I can only touch upon them in passing. In visiting all of these countries, I was impressed with their marvellous capabilities of development, as have been the men who have lived in them for years, and who are investing their capital without limit. In consideration of what there is for America in all

of these countries, we must remember that up to the present time we have made practically no effort whatever to enter into their respective fields.

It is only fitting that I should say a few words about the rich little kingdom of south-eastern Asia, where I had the honor to represent the United States Government for four years. Although Siam is one of the least known nations of the world, it is one of the most interesting and progressive countries of all Asia. It ranks, in its efforts to advance, next to Japan, and is ruled by a King who stands out prominently as one of the ablest statesmen of Asia. There is probably no land in the world of similar population and area which can compare favorably with it in natural wealth, resources, and opportunities, with the possible exception of the Philippines. With about 8,000,000 inhabitants and a foreign commerce of \$40,000,000, it stands to-day on the threshold of great material and political development. With an area about equal to that of the State of Texas, it has a vast extent of fertile valleys and wooded uplands, which, together with rich deposits of tin, coal and gold, invite the investment of capital and the consequent development of resources barely yet appreciated throughout the world. The best rice that is grown in Asia comes from Siam, and it is the granary which supplies a large part of the Japanese and Chinese market, aside from sending a considerable quantity to North and South America and Europe. Its teakwood is of the finest quality grown, and is used in the construction of the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and America. Bangkok, its capital, while great and dirty, like most Oriental cities, is one of the most prosperous ports on the Asiatic coast. With a population of half a million, it is rapidly advancing to the one million mark.

THE NICARAGUA CANAL AND PACIFIC CABLE.

In answer to the question: "What is it necessary for us to do to advance our interests in the Pacific and Far East?" aside from the great main points of holding the Philippines and standing firmly for the open door in China, I would say that the most important step to be taken, in order to clinch our hold as the first power of the Pacific, is the early construction of the Nicaragua Canal. Every year's delay in carrying out this great enterprise will cost us ten times as many millions of dollars in trade as would its immediate digging. Placing the cost of this waterway at its

ultimate limit of \$150,000,000, it can be safely stated that, once open, it would add that amount to our foreign trade in the Pacific Seas within ten years after the first ship passed through it. It will change the great trade routes of the world, and will do more than anything else yet unaccomplished to make the United States supreme in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Already, the foreign merchants of the Asiatic coast are making their plans with reference to the effect upon trade of the opening of this route. We do not want the Panama Canal, and we must not allow the construction of the Nicaragua Canal to be delayed by any false hopes and theories that the Panama can be purchased and finished more cheaply. There is no doubt that the nations of Europe recognize that the completion of the Nicaragua Canal would be the greatest influence in making us politically and commercially the first power of the world, and we must watch against their efforts to retard its construction.

The second important point is the laying of a cable across the Pacific Ocean, from some central Pacific Coast point, like San Francisco, Portland, or Puget Sound, to Hawaii and thence to the Philippines, Japan and China, with possibly a branch to Australia. The tremendous monopoly of the present telegraphic connection between the Far East and America is a great handicap to the development of trade with the United States. I have repeatedly heard merchants of all nations in Asiatic ports say that the cost, time, and difficulties of cable communication with the United States, *via* Europe, worked against the extension of American commerce. With a cable across the Pacific touching these important points, and with reasonable charges, the effect on the advancement of America's interests would be at once felt. It is to be hoped that the United States Government will lend its assistance to any company which makes a legitimate proposition for the carrying out of this great enterprise.

The third great necessity is the immediate improvement of the passenger, freight and mail steamship service of the Pacific. Vessels equal to those crossing the Atlantic should be placed on this route, and as many as possible should fly the American flag. At the present moment, the freight facilities are not equal to the demands made upon them, while the time required for passengers and mails going from San Francisco and other important points is from three to six days too long. We cannot expect, however, that

the steamship companies will make the improvements needed unless the Government is willing to give them the necessary subsidies. At the same time, American lines and the Government must bear in mind the competition of the great European steamship companies, which have already placed steamers on the Trans-Pacific route, or are planning to do so. Trade will welcome their coming, but the Government should make it possible for strictly American lines to compete successfully with them.

Fourth, the Government should bear in mind, in its appointment of Ministers and Consuls to Asiatic capitals and ports, that only men suited to the peculiar Asiatic conditions and demands, both political and commercial, should be sent there, and when once good men have made a record for themselves they should be kept in their places. I make this observation with no personal reference to myself, and would say that I have the highest opinion not only of my successor, but of his colleagues, and I hope that they will be long kept in their present positions. In this connection, it would be most fortunate if special commercial *attachés* could be sent to our principal Legations and Consulates-General in the Far East, to devote their entire time and energies to studying the trade opportunities. Now our Ministers and Consuls are kept continually busy attending to the routine work of their offices.

Fifth, there should be established at such main points as Yokohama, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore, American banks to handle the exchange with the United States. At present there is not a single American banking institution from one end of the coast to the other.

Sixth, American firms should make a practice of sending only the very best men to represent them in the Far East. They should be men of tact and diplomacy, as well as energy.

Further points that might be mentioned would be the establishment of a permanent first-class exhibit of American products at some such place as Shanghai and branches of the American Asiatic Association at all important points on the coast to guard and help American interests; and, possibly as important as anything else, our manufacturers and exporters should bear in mind that they must find out what the Orient wants and make it, and not confine themselves to making what the Orient does not want and will not take. Other minor considerations might be named, but those I have enumerated cover the general situation.

AMERICA MAY DECIDE THE FUTURE OF CHINA.

In a recent address before the New York Chamber of Commerce, I made the statement that America is now the arbiter of China's future. As this opinion has created considerable discussion in the press throughout the country, I will briefly give my reasons for making so sweeping a declaration. Such a responsibility is not the direct result of our presence in the Philippines; it is rather the outcome of recent events in China which have placed the United States in a unique position. When England, a few weeks ago, made her agreement with Russia which delimits, respectively, Russian and British spheres of influence, the United States became the only power which has not directly or indirectly, formally or informally, recognized in any shape or form such fields of particular operation, or, more truthfully, areas of eventual sovereignty. Russia, France, Germany, and even Austria and Italy, have all taken steps which could be construed as leading to the division of the Chinese Empire. Even Japan would take her share, were she permitted by Russia and Germany.

If, then, the United States should by diplomatic note, agreement, or overt act, show their acquiescence in the tendency to separate China into spheres of influence, there would be no other nation between China and her partition, and it is altogether probable that the other great powers would take advantage of our attitude to convert their respective spheres into actual territories of absolute control. China, therefore, sees in the United States her only salvation, and, were we now to look behind the veil not only of the Tsung-li-Yamen at Peking, but of the foreign offices of London, Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg, we would undoubtedly find the deepest interest as to what policy the United States will pursue, when they come face to face, as they must soon do, with the necessity of taking a direct stand on this point. We have much to lose and nothing to gain by the break-up of China, unless we have absolute assurances from all the powers concerned that our rights of trade will be in no way limited, and that there will be no adoption of discriminating duties or differential rates.

OUR POLICY SUMMARIZED.

A reasonable and logical conclusion as to our present policy in China could be summarized as follows. First, we should stand firmly and persistently for the integrity of the Chinese empire, and use our influence for the inauguration of reforms of govern-

ment; second, we should insist on the "open door" and absolute freedom of trade, in accordance with the stipulations of the old Tientsin treaties, from Canton to New-Chwang; third, we should direct our political and moral influence against the delimitation of alleged "spheres of influence," or actual "areas of operation," and withhold formal recognition thereof until, or unless, fourth, seeing the inevitable development of such spheres and the consequent break-up of the empire—without willingness to resort to war—we should demand and insist upon the open door and freedom of trade *with* and *in* these areas of *quasi* sovereignty; fifth, we should consider the advisability of securing a port in northern China, but only in the event of the break-up of the empire, or by legitimate purchase and treaty; and sixth, the United States as far as possible should work in harmony and on the same lines with other powers having similar commercial interests, to protect them from further limitation.

While attempting to outline a policy which, it would seem, the protection and advancement of our interests demand, I recognize the limitations which surround the Government at Washington, and its inability to take actual steps where there is not direct or tangible cause or provocation within the scope of the treaties. Moreover, there remains the necessity of awakening public sentiment to an appreciation of the situation in the Far East, which must precede popular support of the Government along lines somewhat radical and far reaching. If what I write or say may assist, even in a slight degree, in arousing not only our manufacturers and exporters but the people and, finally, their representatives at Washington who largely shape our foreign policy, to a correct understanding, first, of the extent of our interests, and, second, of the need of protecting them before it is too late, I shall feel that I have had abundant reward not only for my long stay in the Orient, but for my humble and sincere efforts there and here to faithfully describe what any student of Pacific and Far Eastern developments, with an eye to his country's good, could not fail to note.

JOHN BARRETT.